12-14-2008, 03:40 PM
I don't doubt Feith's intelligence or intentions, but I think his judgments were flawed. If you are sharp enough you can make a valid argument for just about anything if we allow that certain assumptions are true. It is many of the assumptions that Feith makes with which I disagree.
One assumption is that if Saddam had remained in power he would have become a major contributor to global terrorism. That is very debatable and an assumption I believe is incorrect.
Another assumption was that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. Yes, there was evidence that that was so, but there was plenty of reason to doubt it - and certainly before the invasion of Iraq when the weapons inspectors were back in Iraq combing through the place there was even more reason to think he didn't have any, but that didn't seem to matter. Feith does say he disagreed with the idea of making the issue of weapons of mass destruction as the central reason for invading Iraq but there is good reason to think that without the fear of nuclear weapons coming from Iraq that Bush wouldn't have been able to garner enough support to go to war. The kind of intellectual argument Feith says he advocated wouldn't have done the job, so if he really did object to the "weapons of mass destruction" argument shouldn't be the central one, then I wish he had won the day in the administration because I think we probably wouldn't have gone into that war without it's visceral fear appeal.
An additional wrong assumption he seems to have made is that the US could invade Iraq with a small number of troops and get out quickly, leaving behind a reasonably stable government. Nothing in the history of internal conflict between the Sunnis of central/west Iraq, Shia and Kurds suggests that they would quickly come to an accommodation. It's not clear to me whether or not he thought that there should have been more troops sent in the first place to do the invasion to avoid the problems like the massive looting that happened and the general lack of control necessary, but if he thought there should be more troops and he knew there just were not enough troops available then he should have rejected the notion of invading in the first place. If he thought the small number of troops would be sufficient then that is another assumption that was wrong.
So, sure, Feith is no doubt correct that if this and that and that and that were true then the programs he pushed made sense. But the assumptions of this and that and that were not true. He may be brilliant and well intentioned but he was so very wrong and played a big role in creating conditions where others took and are taking the horrible consequences. I wonder if he ever truly feels the full impact of that.
One assumption is that if Saddam had remained in power he would have become a major contributor to global terrorism. That is very debatable and an assumption I believe is incorrect.
Another assumption was that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. Yes, there was evidence that that was so, but there was plenty of reason to doubt it - and certainly before the invasion of Iraq when the weapons inspectors were back in Iraq combing through the place there was even more reason to think he didn't have any, but that didn't seem to matter. Feith does say he disagreed with the idea of making the issue of weapons of mass destruction as the central reason for invading Iraq but there is good reason to think that without the fear of nuclear weapons coming from Iraq that Bush wouldn't have been able to garner enough support to go to war. The kind of intellectual argument Feith says he advocated wouldn't have done the job, so if he really did object to the "weapons of mass destruction" argument shouldn't be the central one, then I wish he had won the day in the administration because I think we probably wouldn't have gone into that war without it's visceral fear appeal.
An additional wrong assumption he seems to have made is that the US could invade Iraq with a small number of troops and get out quickly, leaving behind a reasonably stable government. Nothing in the history of internal conflict between the Sunnis of central/west Iraq, Shia and Kurds suggests that they would quickly come to an accommodation. It's not clear to me whether or not he thought that there should have been more troops sent in the first place to do the invasion to avoid the problems like the massive looting that happened and the general lack of control necessary, but if he thought there should be more troops and he knew there just were not enough troops available then he should have rejected the notion of invading in the first place. If he thought the small number of troops would be sufficient then that is another assumption that was wrong.
So, sure, Feith is no doubt correct that if this and that and that and that were true then the programs he pushed made sense. But the assumptions of this and that and that were not true. He may be brilliant and well intentioned but he was so very wrong and played a big role in creating conditions where others took and are taking the horrible consequences. I wonder if he ever truly feels the full impact of that.